FLS review ·
Venice $VVV
Evidence incomplete
Open VVV →PUBLIC RESEARCH · CLAIMS · EVIDENCE
DON’T TRUST THE CLAIM.
VERIFY THE PROOF.
Starting with crypto. Built for more.
FIRST begins by checking token launches, project claims, contracts, allocations, promises and promotional statements.
Manual MVP: we accept projects, claims, evidence, corrections and challenges through the existing research form. We review submissions and update the public record manually.
FLS is one crypto research framework inside First Protocol’s broader evidence, claims and accountability system. FLS Methodology v0.2
FLS review ·
Evidence incomplete
Open VVV →FLS review ·
Historical v0.1 score
Open TOLLY →FLS review ·
Historical v0.1 score
Open CP →FLS #003 uses approved v0.2. Its 35–83 / 100 range includes 48 unresolved points; 35 is not a standalone rating. CP and TOLLY retain their historical v0.1 scores.
CLAIMS · EVIDENCE · CORRECTIONS
Suggest a project, submit a claim or source, challenge a finding, or propose a correction. In “Specific research question”, identify the project and FLS/claim, include public evidence links and explain what should change.
Submissions are handled manually. A submission does not guarantee a review or response time.
Submit evidence, a correction or a challenge →Utility and demand, revenue, buybacks, burns and issuance. A separate research direction: how the mechanism works and what demonstrates its execution.
In development / future research. Utility, demand, revenue, value capture, buybacks, burns and issuance are separate from FLS and do not add FLS points.
ABOUT FIRST / FOUNDING MEMBERS
FIRST is building a public, evidence-based record of claims, evidence and accountability.
Starting with crypto. Built for more.
Future Member Reputation = history of reliable, honest contributions.
Contribution Impact = verified usefulness and importance of a contribution.
Future community rewards may take verified contribution and impact into account.
NO guaranteed tokens · NO guaranteed payments · NO guaranteed revenue share.
PROJECT / 001 · BASE
0x001aad84c21a5cd4d696c56d44866e9703c43f77Source review dated 27–28 September 2026
Historical score · Reviewed 14 Sep 2026. The score has not been reassessed.
Historical score uses v0.1. Current framework: FLS Methodology v0.2
Historical score: 74/100 · Original FLS #001 · v0.1 · Reviewed 14 Sep 2026. This correction does not recalculate the score. Any potential score impact requires a separate dated reassessment.
Every correction has a history.
CP / SUPPLY
The reviewed contract caps its own supply at 5 billion CP. A global cross-chain cap is not established by this check.
The code enforces a per-contract limit. Global cross-chain conservation requires separate pool and configuration checks.
src/CPToken.sol · 40–41
uint256 public constant MAX_SUPPLY = 5_000_000_000 * 1e18;
src/CPToken.sol · 136–142
function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external onlyRole(MINTER_ROLE) {
if (totalSupply() + amount > MAX_SUPPLY) {
revert MaxSupplyExceeded(totalSupply() + amount);
}
_mint(to, amount);
}
src/CPToken.sol · 92–110
constructor(
address _treasury,
address _admin,
uint256 _initialSupply
) ERC20("Cluster Protocol", "CP") ERC20Permit("Cluster Protocol") {
require(_admin != address(0), "admin cannot be zero");
require(_initialSupply <= MAX_SUPPLY, "exceeds max supply");
_grantRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, _admin);
_ccipAdmin = _admin;
if (_initialSupply > 0 && _treasury != address(0)) {
_mint(_treasury, _initialSupply);
}
}
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// CCIP CCT INTERFACE
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════Identify minters and inspect their cross-chain controls.
CP / MINT
Yes. A MINTER_ROLE holder can mint while this contract’s totalSupply stays within 5 billion CP. Minting is not disabled.
The code enforces a per-contract limit. Global cross-chain conservation requires separate pool and configuration checks.
src/CPToken.sol · 40–41
uint256 public constant MAX_SUPPLY = 5_000_000_000 * 1e18;
src/CPToken.sol · 136–142
function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external onlyRole(MINTER_ROLE) {
if (totalSupply() + amount > MAX_SUPPLY) {
revert MaxSupplyExceeded(totalSupply() + amount);
}
_mint(to, amount);
}
src/CPToken.sol · 92–110
constructor(
address _treasury,
address _admin,
uint256 _initialSupply
) ERC20("Cluster Protocol", "CP") ERC20Permit("Cluster Protocol") {
require(_admin != address(0), "admin cannot be zero");
require(_initialSupply <= MAX_SUPPLY, "exceeds max supply");
_grantRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, _admin);
_ccipAdmin = _admin;
if (_initialSupply > 0 && _treasury != address(0)) {
_mint(_treasury, _initialSupply);
}
}
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// CCIP CCT INTERFACE
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════Identify minters and inspect their cross-chain controls.
CP / CONTROL
Roles can be assigned by the administrator. No token upgrade or administrative freeze/seizure path was identified in the reviewed source. Current role holders remain unresolved.
Limited source review backed by the registry’s exact-match report. No independent recompilation or fresh runtime comparison was completed in this research session.
src/CPToken.sol · 126–130
function grantMintAndBurnRoles(address pool) external onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {
_grantRole(MINTER_ROLE, pool);
_grantRole(BURNER_ROLE, pool);
}
lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/access/AccessControl.sol · 122–125
function grantRole(bytes32 role, address account) public virtual onlyRole(getRoleAdmin(role)) {
_grantRole(role, account);
}
src/CPToken.sol · 27–39
contract CPToken is ERC20, ERC20Permit, AccessControl {
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// ROLES
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
bytes32 public constant MINTER_ROLE = keccak256("MINTER_ROLE");
bytes32 public constant BURNER_ROLE = keccak256("BURNER_ROLE");
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// CONSTANTS
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Read RoleGranted / RoleRevoked from deployment, replay changes and check hasRole at one finalized block.
CP / LIQUIDITY
No lock has been verified in this research. This is not a finding that liquidity is unlocked.
No complete pool, position or locker analysis has been performed.
Identify pools and LP owners, then examine lock amount, expiry and withdrawal powers.
CP / TEAM
The published allocation is 17%. We have not independently verified the wallet mapping or its on-chain execution.
A disclosed allocation is not a measurement of current holdings or proof of all related wallets.
Map disclosed team and investor wallets, inspect vesting and distinguish allocation from current balances.
14 Sep 2026 · Original FLS #001 · v0.1 · 74/100.
27–28 Sep 2026 · Later source review preserved with evidence and limitations.
1 Oct 2026 · Public correction: “no admin controls” → role administration. Status: Corrected.
Full source review, research history and downloads →
Historical score uses v0.1. Current framework: FLS Methodology v0.2
PROJECT / 002 · ARC
0xbc43ce8dec648ea298c4275559b81d6261c90b67Page updated 29 Sep 2026 · historical score dated 19 Sep 2026
Historical result. Not rescored under v0.2. New claim statuses do not automatically alter this score.
| Insider & Team Allocation | 20/25 |
| VC / Private Sale | 15/15 |
| Unlocks & Vesting | 15/15 |
| Holder Concentration | 6/15 |
| Contract Permissions | 8/10 |
| Transparency | 9/10 |
| Liquidity Fairness | 8/10 |
Market figures on the card belong to the earlier review, not today’s market.
Historical score uses v0.1. Current framework: FLS Methodology v0.2
5 checks at a glance. Each summary links to its evidence and limitations below.
The preserved card establishes what the earlier review reported. An immutable cap and current totalSupply have not been rechecked here.
Next step: Obtain token source, compare it with deployed bytecode and read supply at a pinned block.
Source review: 29 Sep 2026. No pinned block obtained.
The earlier card describes fixed supply. Complete token source was not obtained in this session; no-mint is not treated as confirmed.
Next step: Inspect constructor issuance, every mint path, dependencies and upgrade mechanisms.
Source review: 29 Sep 2026. No pinned block obtained.
Confirmed refers to the existence of the disclosure. FIRST has not established current owners, settings or their applicability to this token.
Next step: Map the token, Pad and dependencies; establish owners and roles at one block.
Source review: 29 Sep 2026. No pinned block obtained.
A code description does not establish custody of the specific TOLLY LP position. Position coverage and withdrawal rights remain Unknown.
Next step: Identify pool and LP NFT, custody, range and liquidity, then inspect withdrawal paths.
Source review: 29 Sep 2026. No pinned block obtained.
The old 20/25 category score does not replace an allocation register or establish absence of related wallets.
Next step: Obtain genesis allocation, address attribution and transfer history; inspect vesting separately.
Source review: 29 Sep 2026. No pinned block obtained.
19.09.2026 · FLS #002 · 81/100 · v0.1
29.09.2026 · Five-topic page added. Original score retained; source disclosures separated from on-chain evidence.
New evidence → review → recorded decision → updated claim and, if warranted, score.
Available descriptions were reviewed. Independent compilation, RPC comparison and complete source inspection were not performed here. Author interests: disclosure not yet completed.
Confirmed — a scoped claim is supported; Disputed — an evidence-backed challenge is unresolved; Unknown — evidence is insufficient; Refuted — the claim is contradicted. There is no whole-project verification badge.
Historical score uses v0.1. Current framework: FLS Methodology v0.2
PROJECT / 003 · BASE
0xacfE6019Ed1A7Dc6f7B508C02d1b04ec88cC21bfReviewed 28 Sep 2026 · launch 27 Jan 2025
35 points supported · 48 unresolved · 17 not earned under established conditions.
This range reflects available evidence. The lower bound is not a standalone 35/100 rating.
48 points remain unresolved. The upper endpoint is 35 + 48 = 83; the range is not a midpoint estimate or a final 35/100 rating.
No VVV holdings. No compensation from or relationship with Venice. The project was selected independently for research because of its current relevance on Base.
Confirmed · disclosure
The report distinguishes initial supply, totalSupply and economically accessible tokens.
Sources and detailed limitations appear in the full report below.
Confirmed · source review
The status concerns reviewed code; controller permissions are assessed separately.
Sources and detailed limitations appear in the full report below.
Confirmed · service observation
Service observations were not pinned to one block. Launch-time configuration remains Unknown.
Sources and detailed limitations appear in the full report below.
Unknown
Initial LP positions, custody, withdrawal restrictions and historical reserves are needed.
Sources and detailed limitations appear in the full report below.
Confirmed · disclosed plan
Allocation execution, address attribution and vesting remain partly Unknown.
Sources and detailed limitations appear in the full report below.
Dated research snapshot · 28 September 2026 · Base · 0xacfE6019Ed1A7Dc6f7B508C02d1b04ec88cC21bf
Dated review using the approved FLS Methodology v0.2. Evidence incomplete: 48 points remain unresolved. Statuses apply to specific claims.
Range based on available evidence. Evidence incomplete.
35 points are supported by available evidence; 48 remain unresolved; 17 are not earned under established conditions. This is not a standalone 35/100 rating or a claim that the project is untrustworthy. The range shows how missing evidence affects the result.
52% of criterion weight has been assessed: 35 supported + 17 not earned. This is assessed framework weight, not a percentage of safety or independent token verification.
| Category | Supported | Unresolved | Not earned | Range |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Insider & Team Allocation | 12 | 3 | 10 | 12–15 / 25 |
| VC / Private Sale | 3 | 12 | 0 | 3–15 / 15 |
| Unlocks & Vesting | 8 | 4 | 3 | 8–12 / 15 |
| Wallet Concentration | 0 | 15 | 0 | 0–15 / 15 |
| Contract Permissions | 4 | 3 | 3 | 4–7 / 10 |
| Launch Transparency | 6 | 3 | 1 | 6–9 / 10 |
| Liquidity Fairness | 2 | 8 | 0 | 2–10 / 10 |
FIRST editorial finding: VVV has publicly described launch terms and accessible code. Material limitations include the issuer allocation, early availability of part of the team tranche and the absence of a hard mint cap. Evidence is insufficient for an exact final rating, especially for historical concentration, allocation execution and initial liquidity rights. No final descriptive band is assigned because the range crosses several framework bands.
The assessed launch occurred on 27 January 2025; the research date is 28 September 2026. Current improvements do not retroactively earn launch points. This is a completed research snapshot with explicit gaps. Preparing this file does not mean it has been published on X.
VVV combines a publicly described launch with material project control over issuance. Immutability of the base ERC-20 code does not remove that control: mint authority is held by an upgradeable staking system. Positive developments after launch remain separate history events and do not retroactively change the conditions faced by initial participants.
Strengths of the available record include a disclosed initial allocation, accessible code and specific transfers to the zero address. The main open questions for the launch assessment are allocation and vesting execution, the launch-time control chain, normalized concentration and initial liquidity conditions.
| Status | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Confirmed | Evidence supports a specific claim within its stated scope, such as code content or the existence of a disclosure. This does not confirm every related promise. |
| Disputed | A substantive evidence-backed challenge remains unresolved. No formal dispute with the project has been opened in this review. |
| Unknown | Sufficient evidence is missing or the inspection is incomplete. |
| Refuted | The specific claim contradicts established facts. This is not a verdict on the whole project. |
Record the source and date separately. An unverified project statement does not become Confirmed merely because it was officially published. The fact of publication can be confirmed while the statement’s factual completeness remains Unknown.
The launch announcement disclosed: 50% airdrop, 35% Venice including 10% for the team, 10% incentive fund and 5% liquidity. The team could access 25% of its tranche immediately, with the remainder released over 24 months. That is 2.5% of initial supply at launch, not 25% of the entire token. [S1]
Confirmed: this plan was disclosed. Unknown: complete recipient reconciliation and the absence of additional related addresses. Do not add 35% Venice and 10% team: the team allocation is included in the 35%. Do not classify all company and fund assets as employees’ personal holdings without establishing control and purpose restrictions.
Venice later stated that the team sold 1% of initial supply at launch, then repurchased tokens and sent them to the zero address. This is a project acknowledgement, not an independent reconstruction of the original sales. The later action does not undo initial token availability. [S2]
The project stated there was no presale; its March publication separately stated there were no OTC deals. The existence of those statements is confirmed. Their publication alone cannot establish the complete absence of undisclosed terms. [S1, S2]
Unknown: independent reconciliation of the full distribution, market-maker agreements and possible discounts. Subsequent company financing is not automatically a VVV sale: equity investments, token deals and their dates must be assessed separately. A “No VC” slogan alone does not earn maximum points.
The published team schedule is understandable, but FIRST has not reproduced its execution across all contracts and recipients. DeFiLlama lists Sablier stream recipients and describes how they were identified; this is a research lead, not a recipient list independently verified by FIRST. [S1, S7]
Unknown: specific stream IDs, balances, recipients, start/end dates, cancellation and redirection powers. Company and incentive-fund restrictions require separate inspection. Calculations for 30/90/180 days must use actual stream dates; an average “24 months” does not replace them.
A current BaseScan holder table was obtained, but launch-time distribution was not reconstructed. Current figures are not substituted for it. The table includes a pooled staking contract and the zero address; treating these as two ordinary whales would be incorrect. The treasury must still be included when assessing control. [E4]
| Current BaseScan observation | Value | Limitation |
|---|---|---|
| totalSupply() | 114 946 312,421673687721667517 VVV | ERC-20 counter; not circulating supply |
| Zero address | ≈33 881 867,5300 VVV | Rounded holder table |
| Staking contract | ≈34 837 290,0468 VVV | Aggregate participant position; not one beneficiary |
| Treasury Safe | ≈20 768 368,8702 VVV | Does not establish personal team ownership |
Readings were obtained separately on 28 September 2026, without a common pinned block. No percentages or scores are calculated from this table. Staking claims, exchanges, LP positions, vesting and wallets need classification; publish excluded addresses and the denominator.
Sourcify reports exact creation and runtime matches for the token. Venice.sol and both Solmate dependencies were reviewed. The code permits owner minting without an application-level supply limit and permits owner changes. No upgrade, blacklist, pause or administrative debit without allowance was found in these sources. This is a limited source review, not an audit. [E1]
| Component | Observed result | Verification level |
|---|---|---|
| VVV owner | 0x321b7ff75154472B18EDb199033fF4D116F340Ff | Read Contract BaseScan |
| Staking implementation | 0xe37A7920dbc11253ac6d031C29f592f71B348DCA | Sourcify proxyResolution; no independent slot reading at a pinned block |
| Staking owner | 0x2D8CB8DC596daD0e1E34E2042E7ae6Df93B11524 | Read Contract BaseScan |
| Safe | Threshold 4, six listed owners; modules=[] | Safe Transaction Service; threshold 4 matched BaseScan |
| Emission rate | 79 274 479 959 411 466 wei VVV/second | BaseScan Read Contract; approximately 2.5M VVV over 365 days |
The matched StakingV2/Staking sources contain owner-controlled setEmissionRate and _authorizeUpgrade. No upper bound for setEmissionRate was found in the reviewed implementation. The current rate is therefore not an immutable maximum. Current owners are service observations; launch-time state and signer independence remain unresolved. [E2, E3]
The March Moonwell publication described 3-of-5; the later Blockworks compilation contains both 3-of-5 and 4-of-6. Readings on the review date support 4-of-6. The change date was not reconstructed, so the older description is not called false without historical inspection. Absence of a mandatory timelock in the reviewed functions does not replace a complete assessment of external Safe configuration. [S5, S6, E3]
The announcement is dated 27 January 2025 and includes allocation, issuance, airdrop rules and contract/pool links. Today’s page copy does not establish when each line first appeared before trading. Timeliness points require an archive or another dated record. [S1]
Discrepancies were noted: the original announcement and staking initialize describe 14M VVV/year; a current FAQ describes the starting rate as 10M. The launch assessment uses dated primary material and code rather than combining these figures. The August update schedules 2.5M from 1 September and 2M from 1 October 2026; the latter was still a future event on the research date. The current reading at review corresponds to 2.5M. [S1, S3, S4, E2]
These conflicting descriptions require source reconciliation and do not yet constitute a formal Disputed status. The 2M rate must not be described as already effective on 28 September.
The launch material names a liquidity allocation and links to Aerodrome. This supports disclosure of the intended allocation and venue. FIRST has not established launch reserves, executable sale depth, LP custody or withdrawal conditions at launch. [S1]
Unknown: whether initial liquidity was locked, the covered share, duration and exceptions. Low liquidity relative to FDV is not used as the sole basis: assess executable depth, actually accessible supply and withdrawal rights. Current liquidity does not substitute for launch liquidity.
The explorer shows successful March transfers of VVV to 0x000…000: the airdrop transaction at block 27 484 391 and an additional transfer of 1 030 000.555 VVV at block 27 484 266. This supports the described transfers at explorer level, but does not by itself establish the source of funds for the original sale or later repurchase. [E5]
In this ERC-20 implementation, an ordinary transfer increases the recipient’s balance without reducing totalSupply, including a transfer to the zero address. Economic removal from circulation and a reduction in the totalSupply counter are therefore different claims. Future calculations must distinguish raw supply, excluded burn balances and the circulating-supply method. [E1, E5]
Category weights remain 25 / 15 / 15 / 15 / 10 / 10 / 10. The subcriteria and thresholds below are FIRST’s editorial rules developed during this pilot, not a pre-registered or scientifically validated standard. Thresholds express the methodology’s values and may change only through a new methodology version. A rule change requires a complete VVV reassessment under the new version. Existing CP and TOLLY reviews retain v0.1.
Formula: S = supported awarded points; U = maximum still-available points on unresolved subcriteria; L = established points not earned; S + U + L = 100. Report [S, S+U]. Unknown criteria remain in the denominator. Do not publish the midpoint as a score. This is an evidence-incompleteness range, not a statistical confidence interval or guaranteed bounds after future corrections.
Scope: launch terms and execution in the first 24 hours of public trading; concentration and liquidity use an end-of-window snapshot. A new review records the exact initial block, snapshot block, sources and rules version. Related subcriteria remain Unknown until the historical snapshot is available. A disclosed plan can be assessed as a plan; actual execution is assessed separately. Horizons of 30/90/180 days provide evidence context without additional hidden deductions.
| Subcriterion | Approved scoring rule | Application to VVV |
|---|---|---|
| A1 · Allocation disclosure · 5 | One point for each numerically disclosed allocation: issuer/team, private investors (an explicit no-sale statement qualifies as disclosure), public distribution, earmarked reserves, and liquidity. This measures the disclosed plan, not its execution. | 5 / 5 · all five purposes were disclosed [S1]. |
| A2 · Address traceability · 5 | 2 points for an authentic token contract and an identifiable issuer. A further 3 require a complete allocation-address register, evidence connecting recipients to their designated categories, and reconciliation of initial transfers. Incomplete reconciliation is Unknown. | 2 supported; 3 Unknown [S1, E1, E4]. |
| A3 · Direct issuer/team allocation · 15 | Apply to the explicitly designated direct issuer/team share of genesis supply: 0% = 15; >0–10% = 12; >10–20% = 9; >20–35% = 5; >35% = 0. This measures issuer economic allocation, not personal misconduct. Do not automatically classify earmarked incentive funds as personal holdings; disclose their control and restrictions separately. Unclear direct-allocation classification is Unknown. | 5 / 15 · the disclosed plan allocates 35%, including 10% to the team [S1]. Incentive-fund rights remain unresolved; the complete control map remains Unknown in A2/D. |
| B1 · Disclosure of private terms · 3 | 3 points for an explicit statement of no private token sales, or disclosure of the allocation, price and vesting of private rounds. 1 point if only the existence of a sale is disclosed. 0 for an established material contradiction. Missing information is Unknown. A no-sale statement earns disclosure points only. | 3 / 3 · no presale was publicly stated; this confirms disclosure only [S1]. |
| B2 · Reconciliation and pricing · 6 | 3 points for reconciliation of disclosed token deals and allocations against addresses and transactions in the review scope. Another 3 for no established discount in a comparable round, or corroborated absence of a private token round within the inspected register. A demonstrated discount earns 0 pricing-parity points even if disclosed. No comparable public round plus no corroborated absence of a private round is Unknown. | 0 supported; 6 Unknown. The issuer’s statement alone is insufficient. |
| B3 · Early liquidity advantage · 6 | 6 points when verified rules prevent private-round or market-maker recipients from realizing their allocation before comparable public access. 0 when the opposite is established. Inspect the declared recipient set and scope; do not claim to disprove every possible hidden relationship. Team TGE availability is assessed in C, not penalized again here. | 0 supported; 6 Unknown. |
| C1 · Disclosed team schedule · 4 | One point each for team tranche size, TGE-unlocked fraction, release mechanism (linear or cliff), and duration. Unknown elements remain pending. All other privileged tranches must also be listed and investigated under C4. | 4 / 4 · publicly disclosed parameters [S1]. |
| C2 · Team tranche liquid at TGE · 4 | 0% = 4 points; >0–10% = 3; >10–20% = 2; >20–25% = 1; >25% = 0. Independently corroborated absence of a team tranche earns 4. Fractions refer to the team tranche, not total token supply. | 1 / 4 · 25% of the team tranche [S1]. |
| C3 · Team vesting duration · 3 | At least 24 months = 3; at least 12 but less than 24 = 2; at least 6 but less than 12 = 1; less than 6 = 0. Corroborated absence of a team allocation earns 3. This assesses the declared schedule; execution is assessed separately. | 3 / 3 · 24 months [S1]. |
| C4 · Execution of all privileged tranches · 4 | One point each for a complete tranche/recipient register, matching enforceable restrictions, actual releases matching the schedule, and absence of unilateral cancellation or acceleration. Include privileged company and fund allocations, not just personally attributed team wallets. | 0 supported; 4 Unknown. S7 is a research lead, not a completed FIRST verification. |
| D1 · Historical dataset · 5 | One point each for a snapshot block, correct denominator, classification of technical holders, beneficiary disclosure for custodial/vesting holdings or explicit identification of incomplete attribution, and reproducible calculations. An incomplete dataset cannot support D2/D3. | 0 supported; 5 Unknown. |
| D2 · Largest economic holder · 5 | After normalization: ≤5% = 5 points; >5–10% = 4; >10–20% = 2; >20% = 0. A staking pool or exchange is not automatically one insider. Exclude demonstrably inaccessible tokens; look through custodians to beneficiaries. If normalization is not possible, mark Unknown. | 0 supported; 5 Unknown. |
| D3 · Ten largest economic holders · 5 | Combined share: ≤20% = 5 points; >20–35% = 4; >35–50% = 2; >50% = 0. Publish the denominator and classification table. This assesses observed economic control, distinct from the original allocation assessed in A. | 0 supported; 5 Unknown. |
| E1 · Token logic · 2 | 2 points for verifiable immutable base-token code. 1 for upgrades constrained by an established timelock of at least 48 hours. 0 for established unconstrained base-token upgradeability. Disclose external mechanisms that can change effective permissions and assess them in E3/E4. | 2 / 2 · reviewed token source [E1]. |
| E2 · Transfer and balance intervention · 2 | One point for absence of pause/blacklist paths and one for absence of administrative seizure or arbitrary modification of other holders’ balances in the inspected verified code. Unverified dependencies remain Unknown. | 2 / 2 · these paths were not found in the reviewed token [E1]. |
| E3 · Issuance constraint · 3 | 3 points if further issuance is impossible or an immutable aggregate cap cannot be bypassed by upgrades. 1 if only an unavoidable hard issuance-rate limit exists. 0 if privileged minting has neither constraint. Emissions are not, by themselves, misconduct. | 0 / 3 · mint onlyOwner does not limit quantity [E1]. |
| E4 · Launch-time administrative safeguards · 3 | One point each for tracing the complete control chain, critical powers protected by a multisig requiring at least two and a majority of its signers, and changes protected by a timelock of at least 48 hours without a bypass. Demonstrably absent powers satisfy corresponding safeguards. Signer count does not prove signer independence. Current settings do not establish launch settings. | 0 supported; 3 Unknown for launch. Current Safe settings do not substitute for a historical snapshot [E2, E3]. |
| F1 · Source provenance · 2 | One point each for an identifiable official publisher and an explicit date on the principal announcement. A page date does not establish unchanged historical content. | 2 / 2 [S1]. |
| F2 · Access to verification · 2 | One point each for publicly accessible materials and an unambiguous link to the target contract. This measures access to sources, not allocation completeness already assessed in A1. | 2 / 2 [S1]. |
| F3 · Historical explanations · 2 | One point for an accessible original dated launch description and one for separately dated public explanations or corrections of material subsequent developments. This is explicitly retrospective: it measures the available historical record at review time, not improved original launch conditions. If no changes occurred, the second point requires verifiable version history, not an assumption. | 2 / 2 · original material remains accessible; the March explanation is separately dated [S1, S2]. |
| F4 · Consistent access rules · 1 | 1 point for consistent published eligibility rules; 0 for an established unresolved material internal contradiction. Missing evidence is Unknown. | 0 / 1 · October 1 and October 31 appear in one publication [S1]. |
| F5 · Conditions before the decision · 3 | One point each for proof that allocation terms, administrative powers and public-participation rules were available before the relevant access opened. Require archived evidence or a timestamp, not merely the article’s calendar date. | 0 supported; 3 Unknown. |
| G1 · Initial liquidity disclosure · 2 | One point each for naming the initial venue/pool and stating the token-supply allocation to liquidity. Disclosure does not establish funded reserves, lock status or sufficient depth. | 2 / 2 [S1]. |
| G2 · Initial liquidity withdrawal rights · 4 | A proven withdrawal restriction of at least 180 days, or irreversibility = 4 points; at least 90 days = 3; at least 30 days = 2; only an established timelock of at least 48 hours = 1; established immediate unilateral withdrawal = 0. Verify coverage of the full stated principal position, LP/NFT ownership and bypasses. Unknown rights remain pending. A lock earns no depth points. | 0 supported; 4 Unknown. |
| G3 · Executable depth · 4 | At the T+24-hour snapshot, model a sale of 0.1% of then-circulating supply through principal public pools. Publish reserves, route and price impact excluding fees: ≤2% = 4 points; >2–5% = 3; >5–10% = 1; >10% or demonstrably impossible sale = 0. Unknown supply, reserves or execution mechanics is Unknown. This is a normative structural test, not a promised execution price. | 0 supported; 4 Unknown. |
48 points depend on unfinished checks. Do not round the range to a convenient 60/100 or divide 35 by 52 and publish 67/100: both hide missing evidence. Unknowns may reflect FIRST’s limitations rather than project opacity. Established adverse facts, unfinished research and absent public disclosure require distinct reasons in the record.
Research priorities: B — 12 points for deals/privileges; D — 15 for historical holders; G — 8 for LP rights and depth; A/C/E/F — another 13. A new fact updates a specific subcriterion, recalculates the result and retains the previous version. An adverse property may be Confirmed: status refers to the claim, not whether it is desirable.
FIRST LAUNCH SCORE #003
VENICE · $VVV · BASE
35–83 / 100
REVIEW SNAPSHOT — EVIDENCE INCOMPLETE
35 points supported · 48 unresolved · 17 not earned.
Public launch disclosures. Uncapped mint authority.
Historical distribution and liquidity controls remain unresolved.
Reviewed 28 Sep 2026 · Launch 27 Jan 2025.
Methodology v0.2 · Approved methodology.
Don't trust the claim. Verify the proof.
29 September 2026 — release-candidate status was removed following the FIRST owner’s approval of v0.2. Evidence, the 28 September 2026 research date and 35 / 48 / 17 points were unchanged. This was an editorial update, not a new on-chain check.
No VVV holdings. No compensation from or relationship with Venice. The project was selected independently for research because of its current relevance on Base.
FLS Methodology v0.2 was approved by the FIRST owner. This file was prepared for release; no X publication was performed. Right to Reply is available through the FIRST form: identify a specific claim, provide a public source and explain the issue. Venice was not contacted and no independent reviewer has confirmed this review.
Historical RC1 → RC2 revision: precise scoring and unresolved-point rules were added; A/B/C/F/G subcriteria were reclassified; disclosed plans, execution and historical-source availability were distinguished. This was the methodology pilot. Cross-project calibration remains limited; existing published scores for other launch models are not overwritten.
The official Venice wordmark was obtained from the Venice API Docs repository; it is an original brand asset, not an invented symbol. The card text is recorded above. The earlier candidate image is retained as history; the current social card uses v0.2 and Evidence Incomplete.
Sources were inspected on 28 September 2026. Direct RPC requests to three providers returned HTTP 403. BaseScan HTML and Sourcify/Safe JSON were accessible through another reading method. Different services were not pinned to one block; FIRST did not complete independent RPC confirmation, recompilation or an audit. Historical transactions have block numbers; they do not date the current readings.
Download sources and observations (ZIP)
FLS assesses launch structure and transparency. It does not assess future price or guarantee safety. 100/100 means the criteria of a particular version are met, not exhaustive knowledge of a project.
Approved by the project owner · 28 September 2026
Every score has a basis. Every unknown stays visible. Every correction has a history.
FLS evaluates launch structure and transparency using publicly inspectable evidence. It does not evaluate price performance, profitability or investment potential. It combines explicitly stated normative preferences with evidence. Its weights and thresholds are editorial choices, not empirically validated predictions.
Review launch terms and execution during the first 24 hours of public trading. Concentration and liquidity use the end-of-window snapshot. Record the first trading block, snapshot block and network; related criteria stay Unknown until the historical state is established. Vesting horizons of 30/90/180 days may provide context without additional hidden deductions. A disclosed plan may earn plan-disclosure points while its execution remains Unknown.
Except for the explicitly retrospective historical-record criterion F3, later improvements do not retroactively improve launch conditions. Keep a separate current-state profile.
S = supported awarded points; U = maximum still-available points on unresolved criteria; L = established points not earned. Always S + U + L = 100. Report the range [S, S + U]. If U = 0, report a single score.
The lower endpoint is not a standalone final rating. Do not publish the midpoint as an estimate. Do not rescale assessed points to 100. The range reflects missing evidence, not a statistical confidence interval or guaranteed bounds after future corrections. State assessed weight as S + L, not as a percentage of safety or independent verification.
Example: 35 supported, 48 unresolved and 17 not earned means 35–83/100, with 52% of criterion weight assessed. An unresolved criterion can reflect unfinished research by FIRST, unavailable evidence, or undisclosed terms; distinguish those reasons.
One point for each numerically disclosed allocation: issuer/team, private investors (an explicit no-sale statement qualifies as disclosure), public distribution, earmarked reserves, and liquidity. This measures the disclosed plan, not its execution.
2 points for an authentic token contract and an identifiable issuer. A further 3 require a complete allocation-address register, evidence connecting recipients to their designated categories, and reconciliation of initial transfers. Incomplete reconciliation is Unknown.
Apply to the explicitly designated direct issuer/team share of genesis supply: 0% = 15; >0–10% = 12; >10–20% = 9; >20–35% = 5; >35% = 0. This measures issuer economic allocation, not personal misconduct. Do not automatically classify earmarked incentive funds as personal holdings; disclose their control and restrictions separately. Unclear direct-allocation classification is Unknown.
3 points for an explicit statement of no private token sales, or disclosure of the allocation, price and vesting of private rounds. 1 point if only the existence of a sale is disclosed. 0 for an established material contradiction. Missing information is Unknown. A no-sale statement earns disclosure points only.
3 points for reconciliation of disclosed token deals and allocations against addresses and transactions in the review scope. Another 3 for no established discount in a comparable round, or corroborated absence of a private token round within the inspected register. A demonstrated discount earns 0 pricing-parity points even if disclosed. No comparable public round plus no corroborated absence of a private round is Unknown.
6 points when verified rules prevent private-round or market-maker recipients from realizing their allocation before comparable public access. 0 when the opposite is established. Inspect the declared recipient set and scope; do not claim to disprove every possible hidden relationship. Team TGE availability is assessed in C, not penalized again here.
One point each for team tranche size, TGE-unlocked fraction, release mechanism (linear or cliff), and duration. Unknown elements remain pending. All other privileged tranches must also be listed and investigated under C4.
0% = 4 points; >0–10% = 3; >10–20% = 2; >20–25% = 1; >25% = 0. Independently corroborated absence of a team tranche earns 4. Fractions refer to the team tranche, not total token supply.
At least 24 months = 3; at least 12 but less than 24 = 2; at least 6 but less than 12 = 1; less than 6 = 0. Corroborated absence of a team allocation earns 3. This assesses the declared schedule; execution is assessed separately.
One point each for a complete tranche/recipient register, matching enforceable restrictions, actual releases matching the schedule, and absence of unilateral cancellation or acceleration. Include privileged company and fund allocations, not just personally attributed team wallets.
One point each for a snapshot block, correct denominator, classification of technical holders, beneficiary disclosure for custodial/vesting holdings or explicit identification of incomplete attribution, and reproducible calculations. An incomplete dataset cannot support D2/D3.
After normalization: ≤5% = 5 points; >5–10% = 4; >10–20% = 2; >20% = 0. A staking pool or exchange is not automatically one insider. Exclude demonstrably inaccessible tokens; look through custodians to beneficiaries. If normalization is not possible, mark Unknown.
Combined share: ≤20% = 5 points; >20–35% = 4; >35–50% = 2; >50% = 0. Publish the denominator and classification table. This assesses observed economic control, distinct from the original allocation assessed in A.
2 points for verifiable immutable base-token code. 1 for upgrades constrained by an established timelock of at least 48 hours. 0 for established unconstrained base-token upgradeability. Disclose external mechanisms that can change effective permissions and assess them in E3/E4.
One point for absence of pause/blacklist paths and one for absence of administrative seizure or arbitrary modification of other holders’ balances in the inspected verified code. Unverified dependencies remain Unknown.
3 points if further issuance is impossible or an immutable aggregate cap cannot be bypassed by upgrades. 1 if only an unavoidable hard issuance-rate limit exists. 0 if privileged minting has neither constraint. Emissions are not, by themselves, misconduct.
One point each for tracing the complete control chain, critical powers protected by a multisig requiring at least two and a majority of its signers, and changes protected by a timelock of at least 48 hours without a bypass. Demonstrably absent powers satisfy corresponding safeguards. Signer count does not prove signer independence. Current settings do not establish launch settings.
One point each for an identifiable official publisher and an explicit date on the principal announcement. A page date does not establish unchanged historical content.
One point each for publicly accessible materials and an unambiguous link to the target contract. This measures access to sources, not allocation completeness already assessed in A1.
One point for an accessible original dated launch description and one for separately dated public explanations or corrections of material subsequent developments. This is explicitly retrospective: it measures the available historical record at review time, not improved original launch conditions. If no changes occurred, the second point requires verifiable version history, not an assumption.
1 point for consistent published eligibility rules; 0 for an established unresolved material internal contradiction. Missing evidence is Unknown.
One point each for proof that allocation terms, administrative powers and public-participation rules were available before the relevant access opened. Require archived evidence or a timestamp, not merely the article’s calendar date.
One point each for naming the initial venue/pool and stating the token-supply allocation to liquidity. Disclosure does not establish funded reserves, lock status or sufficient depth.
A proven withdrawal restriction of at least 180 days, or irreversibility = 4 points; at least 90 days = 3; at least 30 days = 2; only an established timelock of at least 48 hours = 1; established immediate unilateral withdrawal = 0. Verify coverage of the full stated principal position, LP/NFT ownership and bypasses. Unknown rights remain pending. A lock earns no depth points.
At the T+24-hour snapshot, model a sale of 0.1% of then-circulating supply through principal public pools. Publish reserves, route and price impact excluding fees: ≤2% = 4 points; >2–5% = 3; >5–10% = 1; >10% or demonstrably impossible sale = 0. Unknown supply, reserves or execution mechanics is Unknown. This is a normative structural test, not a promised execution price.
Confirmed: evidence supports the precisely scoped claim. Disputed: a substantive evidence-backed challenge is unresolved. Unknown: sufficient evidence is missing or inspection is incomplete. Refuted: evidence contradicts the precisely scoped claim; it is not an unresolved dispute. Corrections are history events, not permanent negative verdicts.
Confirmed does not mean favorable. A confirmed mint power may reduce a permission score. Official statements can establish what was disclosed without proving execution or completeness. Match evidence to the claim: contract/state evidence for powers, historical transactions for actions, authenticated dated disclosures for announced conditions, and attributed supporting research for leads. Wallet association alone does not establish common ownership. A signature or hash authenticates or fingerprints an object; it does not establish the truth of its contents.
Store claim scope, evidence links, source dates, observation block or explicit absence of a pinned block, verifier/method, reasoning and limitations. Avoid double deductions for the same property: allocation size, timing, actual concentration and code control are distinct properties requiring distinct justifications.
A review can be issued as a completed dated research snapshot while evidence remains incomplete. Use Review snapshot · Evidence incomplete when U > 0; approval of this methodology never converts Unknown into Confirmed. Do not label the entire project verified. A 100/100 score means the criteria of this version are met within the stated scope, not exhaustive knowledge or guaranteed safety.
Every review must include its ID, project, network and contract; methodology version; launch period and snapshot; review date; S/U/L and criterion breakdown; evidence and limits; author/verifier; and interests such as holdings, compensation or project relationships. Unknown author disclosures must remain explicitly unfilled, never described as no conflicts.
Every change receives an event date, the affected claim/criterion, previous and new values, evidence, reviewer and reason. Retain previous reviews. Approval, publication, factual correction and methodology change are different events. Ordinary files and timestamps alone must not be called immutable or independently anchored history.
Projects, researchers and community members may submit a specific challenged claim, public evidence and an explanation through the FIRST research request form. The X handle and specific question are optional in the general intake form; a useful correction submission should identify the disputed statement. Intake is not automatic acceptance or guaranteed review timing. FIRST checks the submitted evidence, records its decision and explains any score change. Neither payment, popularity nor a project’s response alone establishes confirmation. A lack of response is not proof of wrongdoing.
| Score | Description |
|---|---|
| 90–100 | Very strong launch transparency / structure |
| 75–89 | Strong |
| 60–74 | Mixed |
| 40–59 | Weak |
| 0–39 | High transparency / launch-structure concerns |
These are descriptive framework bands, not investment ratings. Do not select one band when an unresolved range crosses band boundaries. Never classify a project using only the lower endpoint.
v0.2 retains the seven category weights from v0.1 and introduces explicit subcriteria, numerical thresholds, visible unresolved points, historical/current-state separation and an auditable correction policy. The numerical rubric was developed during the VVV pilot and approved on 28 September 2026; it was not pre-registered before that research. Cross-project calibration remains limited.
Existing CP and TOLLY v0.1 reviews retain their original version and scores. Any v0.2 reassessment requires a new dated review; it does not silently replace v0.1. Future changes to rules require a new methodology version, while factual corrections retain the applied methodology and record a new review revision.
FLS is not an investment recommendation, price forecast, guarantee against scams, guarantee of safety, legal opinion or financial advice. Low scores do not establish fraud; high scores do not establish investment merit. Token utility, demand, revenue capture, buybacks and burns belong to a separate planned product and are not additional FLS points.
Read contract data through RPC. Network access is required; results are not a complete token verification.